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On January 8, 1973, Paul Hayes was indicted by a Fayette County,

Kentucky grand jury for forgery of a check in the amount of $88.30, a
violation of a Kentucky statute punishable by a term of two to ten years

in prison.' During plea negotiations attended by Hayes, his retained
counsel, and the clerk of the court, the state prosecutor offered to

recommend a five-year sentence, provided that Hayes would plead
guilty. The prosecutor informed the accused, however, that, upon a
refusal to plead guilty, he would return to the grand jury to seek an
indictment under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act. Such an indictment, together with a conviction on the forgery charge, would subject

Hayes to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in light of his two
prior felony convictions.2 At the time of the original indictment, the
prosecutor was in possession of sufficient evidence to ask the grand jury
for an indictment under the Habitual Criminal Act. 3 When Hayes
!. KY. REv. STAT. §434.130 (1973) (repealed 1975).
2. Ky. REV. STAT. §431.190 (1973) (repealed 1975).
At the time of Hayes' trial, the statute provided that "[any person convicted a
. . .third time of a felony. . . shall be confined in the penitentiary during his
life." That statute has been replaced by KY. REV. STAT. §532.080 (Supp. 1977)
under which Hayes would have been sentenced to, at most, an indeterminate term
of 10 to 20 years. §532.080(6)(b). In addition, under the new statute, a previous
conviction is a basis for enhanced sentencing only if a prison term of one year or
more was imposed, the sentence or probation was completed within five years of
the present offense, and the offender was over the age of 18 when the offense was
committed. At least one of Hayes' prior convictions did not meet these conditions.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 359 n. 2 (1978). See note 3 infra.
3. [Hayes] was 17 years old when he committed his first offense. He was
charged with rape but pled guilty to the lesser included offense of "detaining a
female." One of the other participants in the incident was sentenced to life imprisonment. [Hayes] was sent not to prison but to a reformatory where he served five
years. [Hayes'] second offense was robbery. This time he was found guilty by a
jury and was sentenced to five years in prison, but he was placed on probation
and served no time. Although [Hayes'] prior convictions brought him within the
terms of the Habitual Criminal Act, the offenses themselves did not result in
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subsequently refused to plead guilty, he was indicted under the habitual

criminal statute, was found guilty on the forgery charge, was found to
have two prior felony convictions and was sentenced to life imprisonment.4
The Kentucky Court of Appeals,5 in an unpublished opinion,' upheld the conviction and sentence, holding that "the prosecutor's decision

to indict [Hayes] as an habitual offender was a legitimate use of available leverage in the plea bargaining process. ' 7 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky agreed and denied a
petition for writ of habeas corpus.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, relying
on Blackledge v. Perry9 and North Carolina v. Pearce," unanimously
imprisonment; yet the addition of a conviction on a charge involving $88.30
subjected [Hayes] to a mandatory sentence of imprisonment for life.
434 U.S. at 370 (Powell, J., dissenting).
4. 434 U.S. at 359.
5. The Kentucky Court of Appeals is no longer the highest state court since, by
amendment to the Constitution of Kentucky, effective January 1, 1976, the judicial
system has been changed. The highest state court is now the Supreme Court of Kentucky. Ky. CONST. §109.
6. Hayes v. Commonwealth, No. 73-766 (Ky. March 1, 1974), memorandum
opinion not to be cited as authority.
7. 434 U.S. at 359.
8. Opinion of the District Court is unreported. 434 U.S. at 360 n. 4.
9. 417 U.S. 21 (1974). Perry was convicted in the District Court of North Carolina on the misdemeanor charge of assault with a deadly weapon. Entitled as of right
to a trial de novo in the Superior Court, Perry filed a notice of appeal. Prior to the
trial de novo, the prosecutor returned to the grand jury and obtained an indictment
increasing the misdemeanor to "the felony of assault with a deadly weapon with intent
to kill and inflict serious bodily injury." Id. at 23. Perry pleaded guilty and "was
sentenced to a term of five to seven years in the penitentiary." Id. The Court held that
it was "not constitutionally permissible for the State to respond to defendant's invocation of his statutory right to appeal by bringing a more serious charge against him prior
to the trial de novo." Id. at 28-29. In a footnote to the Perry opinion, the Court called
for a different result where the prosecution could not have brought the felony charge
initially. Id. at 29 n.7.
10. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). Pearce was convicted for assault with intent to commit
rape. Subsequently, Pearce was successful in collaterally attacking his conviction but,
upon retrial, was reconvicted and given an increased sentence. Pearcewas decided with
Simpson v. Rice. Id. Pearce's sentence was increased by 2 years, II months. Id. at 713
n. 1. Rice's sentence was increased by 25 years. Id. at 714 n. 4. The Court held that
imposing an increased sentence upon reconviction, without delineating the reasons for
the increase, after a defendant had successfully appealed his original conviction, was
tantamount to punishing the defendant for having his original conviction set aside and,
therefore, *'as a violation of due process of law. Id. at 726.
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reversed and held that Hayes was denied due process of law because the
prosecutor's tactics placing Hayes "in fear of retaliatory action for insisting upon his constitutional right to stand trial."'" The Sixth Circuit
remanded the case, ordering that Hayes be discharged "except for his
confinement under a lawful sentence imposed solely for the crime of
uttering a forged instrument."'"
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 3 and, in a
five to four decision," reversed and HELD: "the course of conduct
engaged in by the prosecutor in this case, which no more than openly
presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of foregoing
trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution,
did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 5
The ruling in Hayes can best be explained by the Court's view that
"this case would be no different if the grand jury had indicted Hayes as
a recidivist from the outset, and the prosecutor had offered to drop the
charge as part of the plea bargain."' 6 In plea bargaining cases, the
Supreme Court has traditionally approved of procedures where the state
encourages guilty pleas by providing for a lesser penalty or by promising
to recommend a lighter sentence or to reduce charges. 7 Under such a
system, it is inevitable that the entry of a plea by a defendant will be
encouraged to some extent by the "fear of the possibility of a greater
II. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42-45 (6th Cir. 1976).
12. Id. at 45.
13. 431 U.S. 953 (1977).
14. 434 U.S. 357 (1978). Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Burger, C.J., and White, Rehnquist, and Stevens, J.J., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, J.J., joined. Powell, J., filed a
dissenting opinion.
15. 434 U.S. at 365.
16. 434 U.S. at 360-61.
17. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). In this decision, which promotes
the legitimacy of plea bargaining, the Court held Brady's guilty plea valid as voluntary,
even though his plea may have been coerced by the death penalty provision of the
Federal Kidnapping Act (held to be unconstitutional in United States v. Jackson, 390
U.S. 570 (1968)). The Court found that Brady's plea was motivated by his "desire to
accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of
possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty authorized by
law for the crime charged." 397 U.S. at 751. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790
(1970), decided the same day as Brady, involved similar issues and produced the same
judicial result. See Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brieffor More Careful
Analysis, 55 TEXAs L. REv. 193, 252 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Dix].
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penalty upon conviction."" The Court has also accepted as inevitable
and permissible the fact that the plea bargaining system discourages
defendants from asserting their trial rights. 9 "By tolerating and encouraging the negotiation of pleas, this Court has necessarily accepted as
constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor's interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forego his
right to plead not guilty." 2
However, the Supreme Court has also prohibited states from imposing penalties upon defendants for choosing to do "what the law
plainly allows them to do."21 In North Carolina v. Pearce,22 the state
was prohibited from increasing, without adequate explanation, a defendant's sentence upon reconviction that followed a successful appeal.
Such an unexplained increase in sentence was found to be a product of
state vindictiveness against a defendant for exercising his right to appeal. "Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a
defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play
no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial." 3 In Blackledge
v. Perry,?A once the defendant had indicated his intention to exercise his
statutory right to trial de novo, the state was prohibited from bringing
a more serious charge based on the same conduct.2 The bringing of such
an increased charge was similarly found to be a product of prosecutorial
vindictiveness against a defendant for exercising his right to appeal. It
was held to be a violation of due process of law for "the State to respond
to Perry's invocation of his statutory right to appeal by bringing a more
18.

434 U.S. at 363.

19. Id. at 364. The Hayes Court cited Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17
(1973), where the Court considered inter alia the constitutionality of circumstances in
the criminal process which encourage the waiver of constitutional rights. In discussing
the holdings of the plea bargaining cases on this issue, the Chaffin Court stated:
"Although every such circumstance has a discouraging effect on the defendant's asser-

tion of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices was upheld as an inevitable attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation
of pleas." Id. at 31.
20. 434 U.S. at 364.
21. Id. at 363.
22. See note 10 supra.
23. 395 U.S. at 725.
24. See note 9 supra.
25. The North Carolina two-tiered system allows a misdemeanor defendant con-

victed in an inferior trial court to seek, as of right, a new trial in a court of general
jurisdiction. N.C. GEN.

STAT.
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serious charge against him prior to trial de novo." 6
The question before the Court in Hayes was whether the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals was correct in placing a new procedural safeguard on plea bargaining by applying the due process prohibition
against prosecutorial vindictiveness, established in Pearce and Perry, to
the plea bargaining procedure used by the prosecutor in Hayes.
The Sixth Circuit, in applying the rule expressed in Pearce and
Perry to the plea bargain procedure used by the prosecutor in Hayes,
had made two findings. First, the bringing of an increased charge after
plea negotiations had failed was the product of prosecutorial vindictiveness against Hayes for exercising his right to plead not guilty.2 Second,
the prosecutor abused his broad discretionary charging powers by128using
those powers to coerce Hayes "into foregoing his right to trial.
With regard to the Sixth Circuit's findings, the Supreme Court
observed that, even though the prosecutor in Hayes did not procure the
indictment on the increased charge until after the plea negotiations had
ended, Hayes was fully aware of the terms of the offer. 2 Further, the
26. 417 U.S. at 23.
27. 547 F.2d at 44.
28. Id.
29. 434 U.S. at 360. The Court indicated that it may have reached a different
result in "a situation . . . where the prosecutor without notice brought an additional
and more serious charge after plea negotiations relating only to the original indictment
had ended with the defendant's insistence on pleading not guilty." Id. In a footnote to
that statement, the Court cited United States ex rel. Williams v. McMann, 436 F.2d
103 (2nd Cir. 1970), and United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1370 (9th
Cir. 1976), stating that it did not necessarily endorse the decisions. Id. at 360 n. 5.
In United States ex rel. Williams v. McMann, Williams, indicted for selling heroin,
agreed to plead guilty to the lesser offense of attempted sale and was sentenced to an
indeterminate term of 3 to 7 years. A few days after sentencing, the prosecution discovered that Williams had been convicted of a felony in 1949 and returned him to court
for mandatory sentencing as a second felony offender. As a recidivist, Williams faced
from 3 to 15 years in prison. Williams was granted permission to withdraw his guilty
plea and was tried and convicted on the original indictment. "At sentencing, Williams'
attorney for the first time questioned the constitutionality of the older 1949 conviction.
The prosecution did not take issue with the contention; Williams was accordingly
treated as a first felony offender." 436 F.2d at 104. Williams was sentenced to a term
of 5 to 10 years. On petition for writ of habeas corpus, Williams relied on North
Carolina v. Pearce, supra note 10, and contended that he should only have been tried
for attempted sale and, upon conviction, should only have received a maximum sentence
of 3 to 7 years (the terms of the plea bargain). The Second Circuit affirmed the lower
court's denial of the writ, distinguishing Pearce by the fact that the increased sentence
in Williams stemmed from a conviction for a more serious crime. The Williams court
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Court noted that the effect of the Sixth Circuit's ruling would require a
finding of prosecutorial vindictiveness and a "violation of due process
of law whenver [a prosecutor's] charging decision is influenced by
what he hopes to gain in the course of plea bargaining negotiations." 3
The Court went on to point out the importance and benefits of plea bargaining to the criminal justice system, citing the case of Blackledge v.
Allison.31 In addition, the Court discussed the failure of the Sixth Cirwent on to explain that, when a defendant revokes his plea, the state is not required to
maintain its part of the plea bargain. Interestingly, Circuit Court Judge Hays, who
concurred in the Williams opinion, pointed out that, in Simpson v. Rice, supra note 10
(the companion case to Pearce), "Itihe fact that Rice had reneged on his part of the
plea bargain did not prevent the Court from giving him the benefit of the lower sentence which had previously been imposed upon him." 436 F.2d at 107.
In United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, the appellant was charged with the misdemeanor of unlawful entry into the United States, even though the prosecution was aware
that appellant was a multiple offender and could have been charged with a felony. The
appellant pleaded not guilty and later refused to sign a waiver of his right to trial before
a district judge, a statutory right under 18 U.S.C. §3401(b). Subsequently, the U.S.
Attorney charged the appellant with the felony violation as a multiple offender. Appellant was found guilty and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. The Ninth Circuit,
applying North Carolina v. Pearce, supra note 10, and Blackledge v. Perry, supra note
9, reversed and held that there was "a significant possibility that such discretion [on
the part of the prosecutor] may have been exercised with a vindictive motive or purpose,
[and] the reason for the increase in the gravity of the charges must be made to appear."
534 F.2d at 1369. The prosecution contended, inter alia, "that it was entitled to bring
the more serious charges as a consequence of its authority to engage in plea bargaining."
534 F.2d at 1370. The Ninth Circuit conceded that it had "consistently reaffirmed the
right of the prosecution to bring a heavier charge in the event that the accused reneges
on his bargain, [but] no plea bargain was entered into in the present case." Id. Finally,
and most important in the plea bargaining/vindictiveness context, the Ninth Circuit
stated, "[w]e find no merit in [the prosecutor's] suggestion that the power of the prosecution to adjust the charges against an accused at will inheres in its power to engage in
plea bargaining." Id. at 1370-71.
30. 434 U.S. at 361.
31. 431 U.S. 63 (1977). In Allison, the Court held that a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus should not have been summarily dismissed where the petitioner was
challenging the validity of his guilty plea alleging an unkept promise accompanied by
specific factual allegations, the truth or falsity of which could not be determined from
the record. As to the importance and benefits of plea bargaining, the Court stated:
Whatever might be the situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea
and the often concomitant plea bargain are important components of this country's criminal justice system. Properly administered, they can benefit all concerned. The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties
and uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance
to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there
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cuit to consider the existing procedural safeguards in plea bargaining,
i.e., "the importance of counsel during plea negotiations, Brady v.
United States" . . .the need for a public record indicating that a plea
was knowingly and voluntarily made, Boykin v. Alabama" . . .and
the requirement that a prosecutor's plea bargain promise must be kept,
Santobello v. New York34 . . ...35
The Supreme Court clearly disagreed with the findings of the court
of appeals that the products of state vindictiveness, found to exist in the
Pearce and Perry situations, requiring a due process restraint on the
state's sentencing and charging powers, were also present in the Hayes
plea bargain situation.
In giving its reasons for finding the court of appeals "mistaken"
in its opinion, the Court first reaffirmed the principle, established in
Pearce and Perry, that vindictiveness against "a defendant who had
chosen to exercise a legal right to attack his original conviction" is a
violation of due process.38 However, the Court, citing Colten v. Kentucky 37 and Chaffin v. Stynchcombe3 s (both of which were decided in
light of Pearce), emphasized that the due process violations in Pearce
may be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with
criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal
proceedings.
Id. at 71.
32. 397 U.S. 742. Addressing the issue of procedural safeguards, the Brady Court
stated:
[Olur view ... is based on our expectations that courts will satisfy themselves
that pleas of guilty are voluntarily and intelligently made by competent defendants with adequate advice of counsel and that there is nothing to question the
accuracy and reliability of the defendant's admissions that they committed the
crimes with which they are charged.
397 U.S. at 758.
33. 395 U.S. 238 (1969). In Boykin, the Court held that it was reversible error
for the trial judge to accept a guilty plea without an affirmative showing on the record
that it was intelligently and voluntarily made.
34. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). In Santobello, the Court held that a state's failure to
keep a commitment made during plea bargaining requires that the judgment be vacated
and the case be remanded for determination as to whether the circumstances require
specific performance of the agreement, or that the defendant be given the opportunity
to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 262-63.
35. 434 U.S. at 362.
36. Id.
37. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
38. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
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and Perry "lay not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred
from the exercise of a legal right

. . .

but rather in the danger that the

State might be retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his
conviction. ' 39 In applying the Pearce rule to Colten and Chaffin, the
Court had considered whether the allegedly vindictive state action contained the requisite elements of retaliation. In Colten, the state action
was an increased fine subsequent to an exercise of right to trial de novo.
The Court considered whether the de novo court had any relationship
with the court which had originally convicted the defendant or any
relationship with the previous decision which would motivate it to retaliate against the defendant. Finding inter alia that the de novo court was
separate and distinct from the original court, the Supreme Court distinguished Pearce on the fact that Pearce's retrial and reconviction, resulting in an increased sentence, took place in the same court which had
first incorrectly convicted Pearce." In Chaffin, the allegedly vindictive
state action was an increased sentence imposed by a jury subsequent to
a successful appeal. The Court considered whether the jury could have
been motivated to retaliate against the defendant, but found that the
jurors had no knowledge of the prior sentence and would have been
"unlikely to be sensitive to the institutional interests that might occasion
higher sentences by a judge desirous of discouraging what he regards as
meritless appeals." 41 Therefore, to apply the due process restraints
against vindictiveness on the sentencing or charging powers of the state,
there must be a clear showing that the danger of vindictiveness exists,
but such danger will be found to exist only where the requisite elements
of retaliation are present.
Arguendo, the requisite elements of retaliation born out of the
application of Pearce to Chaffin and Colten were present in the Hayes
case. The prosecutor in Hayes was certainly "sensitive to the institutional interests that might occasion" (and in this case did occasion)
increased charges by a prosecutor "desirous of discouraging what he
regards as meritless" pleas of not guilty. However, in applying the
Pearce and Perry rule to Hayes, the Court was able to create a new
39.
40.

434 U.S. at 363.
Other facts leading the Court in Colten to find that there was no retaliatory

motive in imposing an increased sentence were: that the de novo court was not being

"asked to do over what it thought it had already done correctly," that the de novo court
did not have to find error in the lower court's decision, and that "in all likelihood the
trial de novo court is not even informed of the sentence imposed by the inferior court."
407 U.S. at 118.
41. 412 U.S. at 27.
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element of retaliation and distinguish the cases. The Court found that
the requisite element of retaliation present in Pearce and Perry, but
lacking in Hayes, was the "State's unilateralimposition of a penalty
upon a defendant who had chosen to exercise a legal right." In support
of its finding that state action arising out of a plea bargain is not
unilaterally imposed, the Court looked to the dissenting opinion of
Justice Brennan in Parker v. North Carolina,3 where he characterized
plea bargaining as a "give-and-take negotiation.

. .

between the prose-

cution and the defense, which arguably possess relatively equal bargaining power." 44 Therefore, the Court reasoned, since plea bargaining in
its ideal state is not unilateral, but rather "a give-and-take negotiation,"
the standard for measuring the possibility of vindictiveness in plea bar"the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecugaining is whether
'45
tion's offer."
Having established unilateral state action as a requisite element of
retaliation, the Court rationalized its refusal to find the possibility of
vindictiveness in the Hayes plea bargaining situation by expounding on
the public policy need to preserve the state's leverage in plea negotiations. "Plea bargaining flows from 'the mutuality of advantage' to defendants and prosecutors, each with his own reasons for wanting to
avoid trial."" To protect this "mutuality of advantage," the Court re42. 434 U.S. at 362 (emphasis added).
43. 397 U.S. 790 (1970). In Parker,the majority held that a law which allowed
for the waiver of the death penalty on a capital charge if the accused pleaded guilty had
no effect on the validity of a guilty plea. Justice Brennan, in a separate dissenting
opinion, called for a "particularly sensitive scrutiny of the voluntariness of guilty pleas
entered under this type of death penalty scheme." Id. at 809 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Brennan reasoned that, while plea bargaining was a "give-and-take negotiation . . .
between the prosecution and the defense, which arguably possess relatively equal bargaining power," the imposition of a legislative penalty as severe as a death sentence to
encourage guilty pleas upset the balance in bargaining power. Id.
44. 397 U.S. at 809 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. 434 U.S. at 363. Whether a criminal defendant faced with a threat from the
prosecutor is reasonably able to make an intelligent choice was questioned by Justice
Blackmun in his dissenting opinion. See text accompanying notes 54 and 55 infra.
46. 434 U.S. at 363. The Hayes Court relied on Brady v. United States, supra
note 17, for its "mutuality of advantage" argument. In Brady, the Court stated:
[Tihe State and the defendant find it advantageous to preclude the possibility of
the maximum penalty authorized by law. . . . It is this mutuality of advantage
that perhaps explains the fact that at present well over three-fourths of the criminal convictions in this country rest on pleas of guilty, a great many of them no
doubt motivated at least in part by the hope or assurance of a lesser penalty than
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fused to deny to prosecutors the leverage gained by threatening to bring
increased charges against a defendant subsequent to unsuccessful plea
negotiations.
The Court also addressed the court of appeals' finding that the
prosecutor in Hayes abused his broad discretionary charging powers by
using those powers as leverage in the plea negotiations. Recognizing
that the charging of defendants is entirely within the prosecutor's discretion, the Court quoted Oyler v. Boles,4" which stated that "the conscious
exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal
constitutional violation" so long as "the selection was [not] deliberately
based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other
arbitrary classification." 4 The Hayes Court refused to hold that a prosecutor's "desire to induce a guilty plea" was an "unjustifiable standard"
on which to base his charging decision.49 Since the Hayes Court had
already expressed its intention to protect the prosecutor's leverage, it is
not surprising that the Court would not restrict that leverage by curtailing the prosecutor's discretion in bringing charges. The Court found that
to hold otherwise "would contradict the very premises that underlie the

concept of plea bargaining itself."50 Although it conceded that broad
might be imposed if there were a guilty verdict after a trial by judge or jury.
397 U.S. at 752.
47. 368 U.S. 448 (1962). Oyler v. Boles was consolidated with Crabtree v. Boles.
The facts in Crabtree and the due process arguments propounded by the defendant
against the procedure used by the prosecutor to charge the defendant under the West
Virginia recidivist statute help to define the issues involved in Hayes. Crabtree had
pleaded guilty to forging a $35 check, an offense punishable by a term of 2 to 10 years
in prison. Id. at 450. In accordance with West Virginia's habitual criminal statute, W.
VA. CODE §6131 (1961), the prosecuting attorney, just prior to sentencing, filed an
information charging that Crabtree had two prior felony convictions. Id. at 450. "The
trial judge, after cautioning Crabtree of the effect of the information and his rights under
it, inquired if he was in fact the accused person. Crabtree . . . represented by counsel
. . . admitted in open court that he was such person." Id. at 450-51. The Court then
sentenced Crabtree to life imprisonment. In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
Crabtree argued, inter alia, "that procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires notice of the habitual criminal accusation before the trial on the third
offense or at least in time to afford a reasonable opportunity to meet the recidivist
charge." Id. at 451-52. The Court held that Crabtree was not deprived of due process
because "the record clearly shows that both petitioners personally and through their
lawyers conceded the applicability of the law's sanctions to the circumstances of their
cases." Id. at 454.
48. Id. at 456.
49. 434 U.S. at 364.
50. Id. at 364-65.
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prosecutorial discretion carries with it the potential for abuse, and that
there are constitutional boundaries on its breadth, the Court made it
clear that the conduct of the prosecutor in the instant case was well
within those boundaries."1
Finally, the Court, expressing its concern that plea bargaining had
only recently been accorded legitimacy by the Supreme Court5 2 was
wary of imposing any restrictions on the process which could have the
effect of causing plea bargaining to revert to its clandestine past.
Because plea bargaining has become the principal method of determining guilt and sentence in the American system of criminal justice, a
majority of the Court was understandably cautious in regulating a process which plays such an enormous role in the judicial system. The
majority in Hayes held that a prosecutor's threat to reindict was no
different from the situation where a prosecutor offers to drop a charge.
The majority also found that Hayes had made a voluntary and intelligent choice among his alternative courses of action. However, Justice
Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion, questioned whether a defendant
faced with a threat from a prosecutor is reasonably able to make an
intelligent choice." Where the defendant is faced with clear-cut alternatives and he knows what he has been charged with and what the possible
penalties will be, he can probably make an intelligent choice. However,
when a defendant must evaluate a prosecutor's propensity for carrying
out his threats of bringing an increased charge, the possibility for an
intelligent choice among alternatives is significantly reduced.14 A contrary holding in Hayes would have prohibited a prosecutor from bring51. Id. at 365.
52. Id. The Court cited to Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977), where
it had stated:
Only recently has plea bargaining become a visible practice accepted as a legitimate component in the administration of criminal justice. For decades it was a
sub rosa process shrouded in secrecy and deliberately concealed by participating
defendants, defense lawyers, prosecutors, and even judges. Indeed, it was not until
our decision in Santobello v. New York, 407 U.S. 257, that lingering doubts
about the legitimacy of the practice were finally dispelled.
The Santobello opinion has the distinction of being the first Supreme Court opinion
where the Court actually stated that plea bargaining was "an essential component of
the administration of justice" which, "[piroperly administered, ....

is to be encour-

aged." 404 U.S. at 260.
53. 434 U.S. at 369 n. 2.
54. Dix, supra note 17, at 257. Dix categorizes a defendant's "anticipation of
unfavorable exercise of official discretion" as an "unacceptable influence upon the
decision to waive." id.
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ing an increased charge after plea negotiations had failed. Such a prohibition would have encouraged prosecutors to bring all possible wellgrounded charges against a defendant prior to plea bargaining, thereby
allowing him to make an intelligent choice among his alternatives.
The effect that such a restraint on prosecutors would have on defendants was considered by Justice Blackmun in his dissenting opinion:
The consequences to the accused would still be adverse, for then he would
bargain against a greater charge, face the likelihood of increased bail, and
run the risk that the court would be less inclined to accept a bargained
plea. Nonetheless, it is far preferable to hold the prosecution to the charge
it was originally content to bring and to justify in the eyes of its public.55
Thus, it was Blackmun's view that the function of a prosecutor is to
serve the public interest, and any charge a prosecutor brings against a
defendant should be calculated. to serve the ends of the criminal justice
system. A similar view was expressed by Justice Powell in his dissenting
opinion:
[In Hayes], the prosecutor evidently made a reasonable, responsible
judgment not to subject an individual to a mandatory life sentence when
his only new offense had societal implications as limited as those accompanying the uttering of a single $88 forged check and when the circumstances of his prior convictions confirmed the inappropriateness of applying the habitual criminal statute. I think it may be inferred that the
prosecutor himself deemed it unreasonable and not in the public interest
to put this defendant in jeopardy of a sentence of life imprisonment."8
The minority in Hayes was willing to provide the accused with
procedural safeguards in the plea bargaining arena, even at a cost to
him. It was the dissenters' view that the public interest in a fair and
effective criminal justice system is not subordinate to the interest of the
prosecutor.57 Therefore, according to a minority of the Court, prohibit55. 434 U.S. at 368.
56. Id. at 371.
57. The view that the prosecutor's function is to serve the public interest is also
reflected in the ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function, §3.9 (Approved
Draft, 1971):
3.9 Discretion in the charging decision.
(a) In addressing himself to the decision whether to charge, the prosecutor
should first determine whether there is evidence which would support a conviction.
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ing a prosecutor from bringing an increased charge after plea negotiations have failed would allow a defendant to make an intelligent choice
in plea bargaining, would protect the accused from prosecutorial vindictiveness and would help to insure that the public interest was being

served.
The majority opinion in Hayes will maintain plea bargaining in its
status quo. The minority argues for plea bargaining reform through
restraints on prosecutorial discretion."8 In light of the fact that plea
bargaining, in its present form, is under attack by prosecuting attorney's,59 defense attorneys," and commentators,"1 the majority's decision
(b) The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence might
support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent
with the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that evidence exists
which would support a conviction. Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor
may properly consider in exercising his discretion are:
(i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty;
(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense;
(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the particular offense of the offender;
(iv) possible improper motives of a complaint;
(v) prolonged non-enforcement of a statute, with community acquiescence;
(vi) reluctance of the victim to testify;
(vii) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of others;
(viii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction.
(c) In making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give no weight
to the personal or political advantages or disadvantages which might be involved
or to a desire to enhance his record of convictions.
(d) In cases which involve a serious threat to the community, the prosecutor
should not be deterred from prosecution by the fact that in his jurisdiction juries
have tended to acquit persons accused of the particular kind of criminal act in
question.
(e) The prosecutor should not bring or seek charges greater in number or degree
than he can reasonably support with evidence at trial.
58. See generally National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals, Report on Courts at 3 (1973).
The Commission recognizes that those who criticize the informal administrative
processing of criminal defendants do so primarily because the administrative
procedure involves numerous discretionary decisions made by the various participants in the process, especially the prosecutor. It is this discretionary nature of
administrative processing-and the actual or potential abuse of the power to
make discretionary decisions-that needs attention.
59. See generally M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING, THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1977).

60. Id.
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may hinder the improvement of the plea bargaining process.
Robert J. Crowe
61. See, e.g., Dix, supra note 17, at 260; Note, Plea Bargainingand the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1977).
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